Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1970

State of Utah v. Robert Belcher : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errorsVernon Romney; Attorney for RespondentJohn D. O'Connell;
Attorney for Appellant
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Utah v. Belcher, No. 12077 (Utah Supreme Court, 1970).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/203

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE____

1

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT --------------------

2

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL ----------------------------------

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS ----------------------------------------------

2

ARGUMENT ----------------------------------------------------------------------

3

POINT I. THE 'TRIAL COURT HAD JURIS'DICTION BEYOND NINETY DAYS FROM FILING
OF REQUEST FOR DISPOSITION AND DID
NOT ERR IN SENTENCING APPELLANT, IN
THAT PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN. §
77-65-1 (SUPP. 1969), THE COURT GRANTED
A NECESSARY AND REASONABLE CONTINUANCE FOR A GOOD CAUSE ------------------------------

4

CON CLUSI 0 N ------- -------------------------------------------------------------

7

CASES CITED

Beets v. State, 449 P. 2d 903 (Okl. Cr. 1969) ----------------

6

Lofton v. People, 450 P. 2d 638 (Colo. 1969) ----------------

6

Morford v. State, 395 P. 2d 861 (Nev. 1964) ----------------

6

McCarthy v. United States, 394 U. S. 459 (1969) --------

7

People v. Douglas, 392 P. 2d 964 (Cal. 1964) ----------------

6

Shelton v. Lamb, 460 P. 2d 156 (Nev. 1969) ----------------

6

State v. Cochran, 447 P. 2d 520 (N. M. 1968) --------------

6

State v. Gager, 370 P. 2d 739 (Hawaii 1962) ----------------

6

State v. Mathlis, 319 P. 2d 134, 7 U. 2d 100 (U. 1957)__

6

State v. Polson, 448 P. 2d 229 (Ida. 1969) --------------------

6

State v. Towner, 446 P. 2d 719 (Kan. 1968) ----------------

6

State v. Wilson, 453 P. 2d 158, 22 U. 2d 361 (1969) -- 4, 5

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS-Continued

Page

United States v. Ewell, 383 U. S. 116 (1966) ----------------

5

Ungar v. Sarafiite, 376 U. S. 575 ( 1964) ------------------------

6

STATUTES CITED

Utah Code Ann. § 77-65-1 (Supp. 1969) __________________ l, 2, 3, 4
Utah Code Ann. § 77-65-2 (Supp. 1969) ------------------------ 1, 4

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

vs.

ROBERT BELCHER,

Case No.
12077

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with assault on a guard with
malice aforethought while serving time in the State Prison.
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-65-1 (Supp. 1969), appellant requested final disposition of the 3ISIS3.Ult charge.
Before the period for bringing the case to trial had
elapsed, the State moved for a continuance, whJich motion
was granted.
Appellant withdrew his plea of not guilty and entered
a plea of guilty to the crime of assault on a guard with a
deadly weapon but without malii.ce aforethought. Judgment
was based on the guilty plea of the lesser included crime.
Appellant appeals from the judgment on the grounds
that the trial court was without jurisdiction of the matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-65-2 (Supp. 1969).
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On December 8, 1969, which wa..s within ninety days
of appellant's request for fiinal disposition, the Third District Court, the Honorable D. Frank Wilklins, presiding,
granted the State's motion to extend the time for disposing
of case at bar pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-65-1 (Supp.
1969).
Subsequently, appellant entered a guilty plea to the
crime of assault on a guard without malice aforethought,
a lesser criime than that with which he was charged, and
was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for the 1indeterminate term as provided by law, the sentence to commence at
termination of prior sentence being served.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent submits that the judgment of the trial
court was properly entered while court had jur1isdiction of
the matter and that therefore, the judgment should be
affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant was sentenced and committed to the Utah
State P:vison in 1967 for the crime of burglary [n the second
degree. While serving the burglary sentence, appellant
stabbed a guard and was charged with the crime of assault
with malice aforethought (R. 6).
On September 19, 1969, appellant fiiled notice and request for final disposition of the assault charge pending
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against hlim, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-65-1 (Supp.
1969) (R. 10).
On December 8, 1969, which was within ninety days
of appellant's request for final disposition, the State made
a motion to continue the case to some date beyond the
ninety day period. The court granted the motion and set
trial for January 26, 1970.
The prosecutor indicated that he would be happy to
try the case within the ninety day period, but circumstances
of the case made a continuance necessary. The difficulties
in handling the case withiin the ninety day period involved
appellant's recent notice of insanity plea, and a crowded
calendar. The court was very much aware of the statute
requiring a disposal of a matter within ninety days from
request for disposal, unless good cause is shown for continuance (R. 39). The court found good cause for a continuance and set the trial date beyond the ninety day period.
Subsequently, appellant entered a plea of guilty to the
crime of assault on a guard with a deadly weapon but without malice aforethought, a lesser crime than that with
which appellant was originally charged. Appellant was sentenced to serve an tindeterminate term in prison, the sentence to commence at the conclusion of present sentence (R.
26).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION BEYOND NINETY DAYS FROM FILING OF RE-
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QUEST FOR DISPOSITION AND DID NOT
ERR IN SENTENCING DEFENDANT IN
THAT PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN. §
77-65-1 (SUPP. 1969), THE COURT GRANTED
A NECEISSARY AND REASONABLE CONTINUANCE FOR A GOOD CAUSE.
The issue revolves around Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-65-1
and 77-65-2 (Supp. 1969). The statutes provide in part:

" ... that for a good cause shown in open court,
the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court
having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any
necessary or reasonable continuance." Utah Code
Ann. § 77-65-1 (Supp. 1969). (Emphasis added.)
"In the event that the action is not brought to
trial within the period of time as herein provided,
no court of this state shall any longer have jurisdiction thereof, nor shall the untri.ed iindictment,
information or complaint be of any further force or
effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing
the same with prejudice.1' Utah Code Ann. § 77-65-2
(Supp. 1969).
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that the legislature, by passing these istatutes, intended to put the burden
of compliance upon the prosecutor. However, the prosecutor, WlithJin the ninety day period, for good cause, may move
for a continuance beyond the period proscribed. State v.
Wilson, 453 P. 2d 158, 22 U. 2d 361 (1969).
1

The Utah high court stated that the purpose of the
statute is "to more precisely define what is meant by
'speedy trial' as that term is used in the constitutions of
the variious states." Id. at 363.
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The Uniited States Supreme Court:
" . . . has consfatently been of the view that
' [t] he right of a speedy trial is necessarily relative.
It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to a defendant. It
does not preclude the rights of public justice.' [Citation omitted.] 'Whether delay in completing a
prosecution ... amounts to an unconstitutional deprivation of rights depends upon the circumstances
... The delay must not be purposeful or oppressive.'
[Oitatfon omitted.] '[T]he essential ingredient iis
orderly expedition and not mere speed.'" United
States v. Ewell, 383 U. S. 116, 120 (1966).
The reasoning of the United States Supreme Court
concerning speedy trial may be applied to case at bar. Circumstances justified continuance; announcement by appellant of his insanity defense and the crowded calendar justified continuance to a reasonable date. No rights of defendant were prejudiced. The delay was not purposeful or
oppressive. There was orderly expedition. Request for continuance was reasonably made and was in compliance with
the appropriate statute.
The case at bar can be distinguished from State v.
Wilson, supra. In case at bar, the prosecutor moved for a
continuance beyond the period proscribed. The motion was
made within the ninety day period, and was based upon good
cause shown in open court. The facts fall well within the
constitutional standard of r1ight to a speedy trial, the Utah
statute, and Utah case law.
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The judge did not abuse his discretion in granting the
continuance. Regarding continuance, the United States
Supreme Court has stated that it "is traditionally within
the discretion of the trial judge. . . ." Ungar v. Sarafite,
376 u. s. 575, 589 (1964).
The states are in accord that continuance in a criminal
matter ~s within the discretion of the trial court and shall
not be disturbed unless exercise of the discretion has been
prejudicial to the substantial rights of the defendant. Beets
v. State, 449 P. 2d 903 (Oki. Cr. 1969); Lofton v. People,
450 P. 2d 638 (Colo. 1969); Morford v. State, 39 5 P. 2d 861
(Nev. 1964); People v. Douglas, 392 P. 2d 964 (Cal. 1964);
Shelton v. Lamb, 460 P. 2d 1'56 (Nev. 1969); State v. Cochran, 447 P. 2d 520 (N. M. 1968); State v. Gager, 370 P. 2d
739 (Hawaii 1962); State v. Mathis, 319 P. 2d 134, 7 U.
2d 100 (U. 1957); State v. Polson, 448 P. 2d 229 (Ida.
1969); State v. Towner, 446 P. 2d 719 (Kan. 1968).
1

The continuance granted in case at bar resulted in no
prejudice to appellant, and was not an abuse of the court's
discretion. Appellant was allowed to enter a guilty plea
to a lesser crime than that with which he was originally
charged. Comm~tment was on the guilty plea to the lesser
crime, which resulted in a less severe sentence than would
have been imposed had appellant been convicted for the
crime charged. There was no prejudice to appellant because of the delay.
Furthermore, appellant cannot rightfully complain
that he was not brought to trial within the ninety day
period, where he pleaded guilty. Entering a guilty plea
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waives right to trial. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U. S.
459 ( 1969).

CONCLUSION
The continuance was granted pursuant to the statute.
Appellant was not prejudiced. Therefore, the court did not
abuse 1its discretion in granting the continuance. The court
had jurisdiction at the time it passed judgment and convicted appellant.
Furthermore, the facts of the case at bar place the
case well within the constitutional standard regarding right
to a speedy trial, and within Utah case law.
Thus, nelither statutory nor constitutional rights were
violated. The respondent, therefore, requests that the trial
court's judgment be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
LAUREN N. BEASLEY
Chief Assistant Attorney General

Attorneys for Respondent
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